上海治理论坛第538期
标题：Reducing Inpatient Service Costs under Budget Constraints: DRG vs. DIP（预算约束下住院病人服务成本优化：“疾病诊断有关分组”与“按病种分值付费”两种模式对比）
演讲人：周文慧教授，华南理工大学工商治理学院
主持人：镇璐教授，亿万先生MR治理学院
功夫：2024年11月8日（周五），上午10:00
地址：亿万先生MR校本部东区1号楼治理学院420会议室
主办单元：亿万先生MR治理学院、亿万先生MR治理学院青老大师联谊会
演讲人简介：
周文慧，治理科学领域国际驰名专家，国度杰青、国度自科创新群体掌管人，华南理工大学工商治理学院教授、博士生导师，副院长、智慧供给链与服务运营钻研所所长。广东省质量协会副会长，中国运筹学会靠得住性分会副理事长。钻研兴致重要蕴含智慧供给链治理、大数据分析、质量治理、列队经济学、医疗服务治理等。近年来累计主持承担创新钻研群体项目1项，国度卓越青年基金1项，国度天然科学基金沉点项目1项，面上项目4项。钻研成就颁发在MS、POM、DS、CER、NRL、Omega、EJOR、《治理科学学报》等国内表驰名学术期刊。2012年入选教育部“新世纪优良人才支持打算”，2017年入选广东省教育厅“珠江学者”特聘教授打算。2017年获得广东省哲学社会科学优良成就奖一等奖，2020年获得第八届高档学？蒲ё暄杏帕汲删颓嗄杲。
演讲内容简介
We investigate the effectiveness of two bundled payment schemes that reimburse healthcare service providers for inpatient costs, namely Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) and Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP), within the context of a healthcare regulator operating under budget constraints. While the DRG scheme entails a predetermined payment amount based on projections, the DIP scheme determines the payment amount ex-post based on actual hospitalization records. To analyze these dynamics, we construct a three-stage game-theoretical model incorporating an unobservable M/M/1 queueing system to capture the interactions among the healthcare regulator, hospital service providers, and (in)patients. We find that service providers are more profitable under DIP than DRG, and their service cost reduction decision is closely tied to service capacity expansion decision. Indeed, increased capacity attracts more patients to join the system, amplifying the benefits of lower marginal service costs. However, no single scheme consistently outperforms the other, considering the average cost. We identify circumstances favoring the adoption of DRG or DIP in the regulator’s decision-making process.
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